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The European Neighborhood Policy was supposed to be one of the flagship policies
of the European Union, designed after the last big wave of enlargement (2004-2007)
which brought the European Union (EU) to the shores of the Black Sea, to embrace
poor and hardly democratic neighbors, which urgently needed Europe’s help
without being able to absorb it quickly, let alone to introduce rapid and thorough
reforms. Contrarily to enlargement policy, the ENP was essentially a pro-active
policy. Enlargements were more or less thrust upon the European Communities
(EC) and later the EU in a fit of absent-mindedness, since the EC and later the
European Union (EU) never looked for new members. The ENP, on the contrary,
was addressed to new or old neighbors, in eastern Europe and on the southern and
eastern shores of the Mediterranean, to tie them in and at the same time contain
possible instabilities and spill-overs which might have weakened the EU.
From the beginning an inherent contradiction haunted the ENP though. Was it to
help the neighbors develop and democratize or was it, first and foremost, to protect
the Union from the outer world by a ring of “well-governed” states, a grey zone of
graded marches between the inner core of continental peace and prosperity and the
outer world?
Unfortunately, the Europeans erred on the side of conservatism and procrastination.
The Arab Spring caught the EU off guard and revealed how much European
governments, the French and the Italian ones in particular, had connived with
authoritarian regimes for the sake of stability, instead of talking democracy with the
peoples of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya or Syria. Even the so-called “Tunisian economic
miracle”, hailed by the EU and by the international organizations as well, on the eve
of the revolution, was a total sham: liberalization and privatization mostly benefitted
a few, clan and cronies of the Ben Ali. To that extent, the ENP towards the South
morphed into a policy of stability, i.e. of containment of migrants and of counter-
terrorism, short of any strategic thinking about what long-term stability in the South
required – what Lady Ashton called sustainable stability, too late though as the bush
fire had become inextinguishable. No thoughts were devoted either as to what might
happen to Libya after the fall of Gaddafi. Aside from an EU-mission to guard the
indefensible borders in the desert, those who had wanted – rightly so – to protect the
population from their dictator and tormentor, turned their attention to other countries,
letting Libya slide into disintegration.
East of Europe has hardly fared better. The ENP was conceived, first and foremost,
for Ukraine, the biggest country on the European marches, the closest to Polish
hearts and minds in particular, because of historical ties and minorities, Polish
ones in Ukraine, Ukrainian ones in Poland, and because Poland’s ‘other neighbor’,
Belarus, seemed hopelessly in the grip of Lukashenka, the “latest dictator” on the
continent, as he was called a decade ago. Yet in spite of the Orange revolution in
2004, few hopes lingered on as the tandem that the two heroes of the Revolution,
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Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko, constituted, began to quarrel and
squabble and to mimic democracy rather than to emulate it. As a result, little was
done and, aside for German or Italian businessmen who rushed to Kyiv or Lviv,
hardly any effort was spent to encourage civil society: for instance, visa liberalization
was more talk than deed.
The ENP towards the Eastern Europe suffered from two major flaws. First, extended
also to Moldova and to the three Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan, the ENP boiled down to little more than “we pretend to help you and
you pretend to reform”.  It took a few years and the determination of the Polish and
Swedish governments, backed by Berlin, to ratchet up the offer with more palatable
rewards. The so-called Eastern Partnership (EaP) involved the inclusion of the
recipients into a free-trade area and visa liberalization, two of the mostly coveted
prizes, in return for gradual improvements in their make-up, institutions and markets.
In other words, a policy of “positive tit-for-tat”, “you do this and I’ll do that”, was
devised.
However, and this was the biggest flaw which confronts us to-day, aside from
trying to stabilize the marches without much success, strategic thinking was cruelly
missing. While the European Commission was engrossed in the nuts and bolts of
technicalities, the member states were torn between ignoring Eastern Europe and
its overbearing eastern neighbor, from which they had just wrenched themselves,
Russia, fearing it, or doing business with it. Aside from the Poles, the Balts or
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the EU member states preferred to ignore the
link between the ENP and a policy, by the way absent, towards Russia. The EU
turned more or less a blind eye to the so-called frozen conflicts, from Transnistria to
South Ossetia, though they were never frozen on the ground. It did not dare to send
EU observers to Georgia before the war that Russia waged against it in 2008 (with
a little help from Mikheïl Saakashvili, though), deploying an EU mission after the
Russian troops had sealed off the enclaves, preventing the mission to enter them.
Though it was not a “little war that shook the world”, as Ronald Asmus contended,
the war in Georgia clearly indicated what the master in the Kremlin intended:
to draw a line in the sand, to create on the ground and foster the emergence of
“entities”. The latest is Crimea, now returned to Mother Russia by stealth, infiltration,
disinformation and manipulation, in short by 19th centuries raw force and 21st
century viruses. This was clearly in the making for some years – and clearly
announced by Vladimir Putin when he lamented the fall of the Soviet Union. The
question which remains open is how many hypotheses are on Vladimir Putin’s
agenda: probably several, from the minimal one, surrounding himself with confetti of
empire, to the grand coup of overtaking Eastern Ukraine and recreating a contiguous
empire from Transnistria to South Ossetia … – and more?
Finally, the EU has woken up to geopolitics. Most crucially, the government in Berlin
shed the last glimmer of hope it entertained when it was dreaming that the man in
the Kremlin might be amenable to dialogue and win-win reasoning. Vladimir Putin,
in turn, has shed all pretenses of speaking the West’s language, breaking his word,
and showing contempt for our values. To Chancellor Merkel, this is unforgiveable,
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and her minister of Foreign Affairs, who as Foreign Minister in Angela Merkel’s first
grand coalition, sought to devise an “Ostpolitik Two”, is as determined as she is, in
having the EU get its act together. Germany is the pivot. The question is whether
France, Italy, or the UK will be as ready as the German government to pay an
economic price, if need be, and whether what Winston Churchill called the soft belly
of Europe, from Serbia, an EU-candidate, to Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria will follow
suit.
Before revamping any European Neighborhood Policy, it is a strategy vis-à-vis
Russia that is in dire need. The European Neighborhood Policy was supposed to
be one of the flagship policies of the European Union, designed after the last big
wave of enlargement (2004-2007) which brought the European Union (EU) to the
shores of the Black Sea, to embrace poor and hardly democratic neighbors, which
urgently needed Europe’s help without being able to absorb it quickly, let alone to
introduce rapid and thorough reforms. Contrarily to enlargement policy, the ENP
was essentially a pro-active policy. Enlargements were more or less thrust upon the
European Communities (EC) and later the EU in a fit of absent-mindedness, since
the EC and later the European Union (EU) never looked for new members. The
ENP, on the contrary, was addressed to new or old neighbors, in Eastern Europe
and on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, to tie them in and
at the same time contain possible instabilities and spill-overs which might have
weakened the EU.
From the beginning an inherent contradiction haunted the ENP though. Was it to
help the neighbors develop and democratize or was it, first and foremost, to protect
the Union from the outer world by a ring of “well-governed” states, a grey zone of
graded marches between the inner core of continental peace and prosperity and the
outer world?
Unfortunately, the Europeans erred on the side of conservatism and procrastination.
The Arab Spring caught the EU off guard and revealed how much European
governments, the French and the Italian ones in particular, had connived with
authoritarian regimes for the sake of stability, instead of talking democracy with the
peoples of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya or Syria. Even the so-called “Tunisian economic
miracle”, hailed by the EU and by the international organizations as well, on the eve
of the revolution, was a total sham: liberalization and privatization mostly benefitted
a few, clan and cronies of the Ben Ali. To that extent, the ENP towards the South
morphed into a policy of stability, i.e. of containment of migrants and of counter-
terrorism, short of any strategic thinking about what long-term stability in the South
required – what Lady Ashton called sustainable stability, too late though as the bush
fire had become inextinguishable. No thoughts were devoted either as to what might
happen to Libya after the fall of Gaddafi. Aside from an EU-mission to guard the
indefensible borders in the desert, those who had wanted – rightly so – to protect the
population from their dictator and tormentor, turned their attention to other countries,
letting Libya slide into disintegration.
East of Europe has hardly fared better. The ENP was conceived, first and foremost,
for Ukraine, the biggest country on the European marches, the closest to Polish
hearts and minds in particular, because of historical ties and minorities, Polish
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ones in Ukraine, Ukrainian ones in Poland, and because Poland’s ‘other neighbor’,
Belarus, seemed hopelessly in the grip of Lukashenka, the “latest dictator” on the
continent, as he was called a decade ago. Yet in spite of the Orange revolution in
2004, few hopes lingered on as the tandem that the two heroes of the Revolution,
Yulia Tymoshenko and Viktor Yushchenko, constituted, began to quarrel and
squabble and to mimic democracy rather than to emulate it. As a result, little was
done and, aside for German or Italian businessmen who rushed to Kyiv or Lviv,
hardly any effort was spent to encourage civil society: for instance, visa liberalization
was more talk than deed.
The ENP towards the Eastern Europe suffered from two major flaws. First, extended
also to Moldova and to the three Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan, the ENP boiled down to little more than “we pretend to help you and
you pretend to reform”.  It took a few years and the determination of the Polish and
Swedish governments, backed by Berlin, to ratchet up the offer with more palatable
rewards. The so-called Eastern Partnership (EaP) involved the inclusion of the
recipients into a free-trade area and visa liberalization, two of the mostly coveted
prizes, in return for gradual improvements in their make-up, institutions and markets.
In other words, a policy of “positive tit-for-tat”, “you do this and I’ll do that”, was
devised.
However, and this was the biggest flaw which confronts us to-day, aside from
trying to stabilize the marches without much success, strategic thinking was cruelly
missing. While the European Commission was engrossed in the nuts and bolts of
technicalities, the member states were torn between ignoring Eastern Europe and
its overbearing eastern neighbor, from which they had just wrenched themselves,
Russia, fearing it, or doing business with it. Aside from the Poles, the Balts or
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the EU member states preferred to ignore the
link between the ENP and a policy, by the way absent, towards Russia. The EU
turned more or less a blind eye to the so-called frozen conflicts, from Transnistria to
South Ossetia, though they were never frozen on the ground. It did not dare to send
EU observers to Georgia before the war that Russia waged against it in 2008 (with
a little help from Mikheïl Saakashvili, though), deploying an EU mission after the
Russian troops had sealed off the enclaves, preventing the mission to enter them.
Though it was not a “little war that shook the world”, as Ronald Asmus contended,
the war in Georgia clearly indicated what the master in the Kremlin intended though:
to draw a line in the sand, to create on the ground and foster the emergence of
“entities”. The latest is Crimea, now returned to Mother Russia by stealth, infiltration,
disinformation and manipulation, in short by 19th centuries raw force and 21st
century viruses. This was clearly in the making for some years – and clearly
announced by Vladimir Putin when he lamented the fall of the Soviet Union. The
question which remains open is how many hypotheses are on Vladimir Putin’s
agenda: probably several, from the minimal one, surrounding himself with confetti of
empire, to the grand coup of overtaking Eastern Ukraine and recreating a contiguous
empire from Transnistria to South Ossetia … – and more?
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Finally, the EU has woken up to geopolitics. Most crucially, the government in Berlin
shed the last glimmer of hope it entertained when it was dreaming that the man in
the Kremlin might be amenable to dialogue and win-win reasoning. Vladimir Putin,
in turn, has shed all pretenses of speaking the West’s language, breaking his word,
and showing contempt for our values. To Chancellor Merkel, this is unforgiveable,
and her minister of Foreign Affairs, who as Foreign Minister in Angela Merkel’s first
grand coalition, sought to devise an “Ostpolitik Two”, is as determined as she is, in
having the EU get its act together. Germany is the pivot. The question is whether
France, Italy, or the UK will be as ready as the German government to pay an
economic price, if need be, and whether what Winston Churchill called the soft belly
of Europe, from Serbia, an EU-candidate, to Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria will follow
suit.
Before revamping any European Neighborhood Policy, it is a strategy vis-à-vis
Russia that is in dire need.
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